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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

In The :Niatter of the Adoption of
GERALD ASEL WALTON and

Case No. 793·3

JOHN EARL \VALTON,
Minors ..

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree entered
in the district court of Salt Lake County, after a contested
trial. The court -found that Appellant had abandoned and
deserted his children, John Earl Walton and Gerald Asel Walton. The district court decreed the adoption of the children
by Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Gerald B. Walton, the father of Gerald Asel
Walton and John Earl Walton, and Respondent, Mrs. Caroline
3
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Walton Worthen, were married in Nebraska in 1938 (R. 10).
After their marriage they lived for a few months in Utah.
Then-they moved to Nevada and lived there for approxin1ately
two and one-half years .. The children here in question 'vere
born to them while they lived in Nevada (R. 16). Mr. and
Mrs. Walton moved from Nevada to Arkansas where they
lived together until the spring or summer of 1944 (R. 10).
In 1944 lv(rs. Walton left Mr. Walton and brought her children, .Gerald· Asel Walton and John Earl Walton, to Salt
Lake City, Utah to live. After Mrs. Walton left Arkansas Mr.
Walton ob.tain~d a divorce from her in Askansas (R. 8).
Mrs. Walt~n liyed in Salt Lake City with John and Gerald
from 1944 until July of 1947. In July of 1947 John and Gerald
went to Arkansas and lived with their father for one year.
From .July of 1948 until January of ·1949 John and Gerald
lived with Mrs. Walton in Salt Lake City. In January of 1949
Mrs. Walton married her present husband and the children
have lived with them since that time.
When Mrs. Walton arrived in Utah In 1944, she accepted employment in order to provide for her children
(R. ~ 1). She did not earn enough to enable her to meet the
expenses of herself and her family and there were times when
she wrote to Mr. Walton and requested financial assistance
(R. 20, 57). Itappears that Mr. Walton sent money to her
in response to each of her requests (R. 20). The record shows
that Mr. Walton sent Mrs. Walton money with which to help
support John and Gerald on approximately 15 occasions in
the three year period from 1944 to July of_ 1947 (R. til, 1S).
He also gave Mrs. Walton $100.00 when he \vas in Salt Lake
4
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City in 1945 and he paid some of her expenses in amounts not
specified ( R. 40) .
During the years between 1944 and 1947, Appellant was
ill much of the time (R. 40). He borrowed n1oney in order
to meet some of Mrs. Walton's requests for aid (R. 41), and
he sent Mrs. Walton money on some occasions when it was
not requested (R. 58). During part of the time when he sent
assistance to Mrs. Walton, he sent it through a third person
because Mrs. Walton would not tell him where-she was (R. 41).
In July of 1947 Mrs. Walton sent the two boys to Arkansas
for six months to live with their father (R. 21). At the expiration of which time he was to have returned them to Salt
Lake City. He refused to do that (R. 21) and Mrs. Walton
travelled to Arkansas and returned with th~m to Salt Lake
City (R. 20).
In October of 1948, Mrs. Walton sought and obtained
a decree from the District Court for Salt Lake County aw~rding
her the exclusive custody of the children here in question (R.
7, 8, 10).
Appellant was not a p~rty to the decree of 1948, he was
not personally served, nor did he waive service of process
(R. 9). The decree appealed from does not rely on _the 1948
decree as. the basis for the granting of the petition of adoption

(R. 61, 62).
Between July 1948 and the bringing ·of this ·action, Appdlant had seen the children, John and Gerald, three or four
titnes (R. 30) . Appellant travelled to Salt Lake City to see
his sons, but insofar as the Respondents were able to do so,
j
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they prevented Mr. Walton from spending any time with John
and Gerald (R. 46). Appellant visited the Respondents in
. March of 1950 and inquired if there was not some way in
which a settlement could be reached so that he could see his
children {R. 46). At that time he was told to go away and
leave the Respondents alone (R. 46). Mr. Walton was in
Salt Lake City in February of 1952 and tried to see his children.
but again was prevented. by the Respondents from seeing
them (R. 46).
Mr. Walton sent John and Gerald presents for their birthdays and for Christmas while they lived with the Worthens
(R. 36, 41). He sent them presents at times other than those
occasions (R. 42) .
On April 6, 1952, Respondents filed a petition to have
. the children declared abandoned and deserted and to adopt
them. At the trial, the Judge called for the report of the Department of Public Welfare (R. 7) and the Judge read the
report during the ·course of the trial.
On October 28, 1952, the District Court of Salt Lake
County determined that the children had been abandoned and
deserted and decreed their adoption by Respondents (R. 61).

STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE EVIDENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE
COURT THAT THE APPELLANT ABANDONED AND
DESERTED HIS CHILDREN.

6
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II.
THE REPORT. OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.

ARGUMENT

I.
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE . EVIDENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE
COURT THAT THE APPELLANT ABANDONED AND
DESERTED HIS CHILDREN.
Our statutes provide that a child rna y be adopted without
the consent of either parent when the district court of the
county where the person petitioning for an adoption resides;
determines that the child in question has been deserted, 78-30-5
Utah Code Annot~ted, 1953. The Supreme Court of Utah has
ruled many times on cases which have. involved the custody
of children. Issues "involved in child custody cases set forth in
Walton v.. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97 in a manner
which renders any further attempt to deal with that subject
superfluous. This case does not involve the rights of the parties
to the custody o~ the children here in question. The decision
of the court in this case as to whether or not the children
have been abandoned or deserted by the Appellant cannot be
. derived from questions bearing upon the welfare of the children. Sberry ZJ. Doyle, 68 Utah 74, 249 P.· 250, 253. The question of the welfare of the children is not reached in a pro7
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· ceeding of this nature until it is determined that there has
been an abandonment or a desertion. In re Ado ptioJJ of
Strauser, 196 P. 2d 862; In Re Cazza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161;
In ~e Kelly, 25 Cal. App. 651, 145 P. 156. See also: In Re
Snowball's Estate, 156 Cal. 240, 104 Pac. 444.
The only issue in this case is whether or not Appellant
had abandoned or deserted the children so as to render his
co~sent to the adoption unnecessary. Appellant has not found
any Utah case which has defined the word deserted as used
in 78~30-5, U.C.A. 1953. Most of the Utah cases dealing with
child custody are cited in Walton v. Coffntan and most of
them arise from habeas corpus proceedings. In those cases,
the court refers to the loss of the parents' rights to custody
either by agreement or conduct. Walton Coffman, supra. The
word desert is used in a recent Utah case, Taylor-~. W addoups,
241 P; 2d 15.7, 161 but it is not defined.

v.

In several of the Utah cases, the court seems to have been
talking about desertion rather than · abandonment, as defined
in Jensen v. Early, 63 Utah 604, 228 P. 217. But the court
used the terms abandonment, forfeiture, or surrender of legal
rights rather than the term desertion. Walton v. CoffuJan, supra.
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 P. 423. W a/lick v. Va1ue,
76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103. Hu1n1nel v. Parrish, 43 Utah }73.
134 P. 298. Appellant has found very often the word desert
is defined in te;ms of abandon. See: Finn v. Reese, 141 P.
2d, 976, an Idaho case. JP" ords and Phrctses, Desertion, P.
248, Vol. 12; 39 An1. j11r. 1046. Black's Lau) Dictionar_}'. ThirJ
Edition, p. 565.

8
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Adoption is statutory, and the courts say that the consent
lies at the foundation of the statute. In ReAdoption of .Strauser,
supra., and the many cases cited therein. nln an adoption proceeding when a parent refuses to consent, and the matter in
controversy is whether he had abandoned the child so as to
dispense with the necessity of his consent, the burden of proof
is on the party seeking to justify the adoption on that ground
and the courts often say that the evidence to show abandonment must be clear and convincing. See: In Re Bistany, .209
App. Div. 286, 204 N.Y.S. 599; In Re Kelly, supra.; Petition.
of Rice,. 179 Wis. 531, 192 N.W. 56; Mastrovich v. Mavric, ·
66 S.D. 577, 287 N.W. 97." In Re Strauser, supra..
''An abandonment is a question of intention, which must
be shown by a clear unequivocal, and decisive act of the party
-an act done that shows a determination hot to have the
benefit to which he is entitled. Breedlove v. Stump, 11 Tenn.

(3 Yerg) 257, 276. Abandoment, in such cases, ordinarily
means that the parent has placed the child on some doorstep
or left. it some convenient place in the · hope that someone
will find it and take charge of it, or has abandoned it entirely to chance or fate." Taylor_ v. W addoups, supra, quoting
from Jensen v. Early, supra. See also: In Re Cozza, supra. In
Re Kelly, supra. In Re Snowbalfs Estate, supra.
There is nothing in the record of this trial which shows
any act of abandonment on the part of Appellant. Mrs. Walton .
took the children from Appellant's home in 1944/ (R. 17).
Fron1 July of 1947 to July of 1948~ Mr. Walton cared for the ·
children in his hotne; When they, the children, left Arkansas
in 1948 it was because Mrs .. Walton took them from Mr. Wal9
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ton (R. 20). Neither is there sufficient evidence in the record
from which to find that Mr. Walton deserted his children.
From 1944 until July of 1947, Appellant responded to every
request for help made by Mrs. Walton and volunteered considerable assistance.
Following Mrs. Walton's marriage to Mr. Worthen, the
W orthens did not ask for any assistance from Appellant. They
refused his gifts to his children and asked him to leave them.
Respondents and the children, alone. It does not follo\v from
that that Appellant deserted his children, rather he was driven
away from them.
Appellant desires to call the Court's attention to an error
in the record. The decree of the district court appealed from
refers to the action· brought by Mrs. Walton in 1948 as a
divorce decree (R. 61). That is not correct (R. 7, 8, 10). It
was an action brought by Mrs. Walton to have the exclusive
custody of the children decreed to her (R. 8). This point is
not argued further because the court did not rely on that decree
in its judgment in the action from which this appeal is taken.

II.
THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS EVI·
DENCE IN THIS CASE.
Appellant contends that the report of the Department
of Public Welfare should not be considered on the issue of
this case. Title 78-30-14 requtres the Department of Public
10
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\Xrelfare to make a report to the court on certain subjects
when a petition for adoption is filed· and a written consent of
a licensed child-placing agency is not filed with the petition
for adoption. The Department must report on whether the
natural parents have abandoned such child or are morally
unfit to have its custody.
It is Appellant's contention that that report was intended
by the Legislature to advise the court as to the wisdom of
allowing the petition for adoption. It was not intended to be
used as evidence on the· question of abandonment in contested ·
cases such as this.
Appellant does not know ~hat is contained in the report
of the Department of Public Welfare. It is the Appellant's
position that whatever the contents of this report, it cannot
under elementary rules of evidence, be considered by the trial
court in resolving the question of abandonment nor, do we
believe~ that this Court may consi~er. that report in determining
\Vhether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of
the trial court. This report is not only hearsay, but Appellant
at no stage of the proceeding has had the opportunity to crossexamine ~n any evidence that might be therein contained.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that he has not deserted
or aba1;1doned his children. Rather he has manifested a real
concern and sense of responsibility for his children and a desire
to retain his natural relationship with them. Certainly he did
not abandon or desert them prior to January of 1949. Since
l l
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1949 he has been prevented by Respondents from assuming
his rightful role as the father of these two boys. A desertion
or abandonment by .Appellant cannot result from acts of the
Respondents which prevented Appellant from associating 'vith
his sons. This Court should not sever the natural relationship
of the Appellant _with his sons under the facts of this case.
Respectfully submitted,
DALLAS H. YOUNG and
·DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.
of the Firm of
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSE!\
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